

Connections and Applicants' Self-Selection: Evidence from a Natural Randomized Experiment*

Manuel Bagues [†] Mauro Sylos-Labini [‡] Natalia Zinovyeva [§]

September 11, 2017

Abstract

Prospective candidates with connections in committees may have access to more accurate information about evaluation standards. When applications are costly, this informational advantage may reduce the application rate of connected individuals, leading to a positive selection of connected applicants. We document the relevance of this phenomenon using data from national evaluations in Italian academia. Researchers are significantly less likely to apply when the committee includes, through the luck of the draw, a colleague or a coauthor. At the same time, they tend to receive more favorable evaluations from their connections. Our analysis indicates that self-selection may bias in a non-trivial way estimates of evaluation biases that rely on observational data.

Keywords: connections, self-selection, academic labor markets

JEL Classification: J71, I23

*We would like to thank Mikhail Drugov, Chris Krestel, Marta Martinez-Troya, Oskar Nordström Skans, Marko Terviö, Otto Toivanen and participants in presentations at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, the Swedish Institute for Social Research, Helsinki Center of Economic Research, CERGE-EI Prague, Humboldt University, the Trento Festival dell'Economia, Jyväskylä University, Society of Labor Economics, Nordic Summer Institute in Labor Economics, "Brucchi Luchino" Workshop and the annual meeting of the American Economic Association for their useful comments.

[†]Aalto University and IZA, Helsinki, Finland; email: manuel.bagues@aalto.fi

[‡]University of Pisa, Italy; email: mauro.syloslabini@unipi.it

[§]Aalto University, Helsinki, Finland; email: natalia.zinovyeva@aalto.fi

1 Introduction

Connections with evaluators tend to be helpful. For instance, in the context of academic evaluations, a number of studies have shown that the presence of a colleague or a co-author in a scientific committee or an editorial board tends to increase researchers' chances of success (Brogaard, Engelberg and Parsons 2014, Combes, Linnemer and Visser 2008, De Paola and Scoppa 2015, Durante, Labartino and Perotti 2011, Laband and Piette 1994, Perotti 2002, Sandström and Hällsten 2008, Zinovyeva and Bagues 2015). Sometimes connected candidates benefit from favoritism. In other occasions, their higher success rate reflects the existence of information asymmetries: evaluators tend to prefer candidates whose quality they observe more accurately.

In this paper, we argue that, beyond their direct impact on evaluations, connections in committees may also help prospective candidates to make better application decisions. This channel may be relevant in contexts where applications or failure are costly, and prospective candidates with ties to panel members are better informed about their chances of success. When application costs are high, informed individuals are more likely to take advantage of opportunities that uninformed ones would not dare to seek. On the contrary, when applications costs are low (but positive), they are less likely to make the mistake of applying when their chances of success are too slim.

We study empirically how connections affect application decisions using the evidence provided by the Italian system of academic qualifications. Since 2012, in order to be promoted to associate and full professor positions, researchers are required to qualify first in a national evaluation conducted annually at the field level. Successful applicants can then apply for a position at the university level. Candidates who fail to qualify have to wait for two years before they can apply again. Given the penalization faced by unsuccessful applicants, researchers who anticipate that their chances of success are slim may prefer to postpone their application until they have sufficiently strengthened their curriculum.

This set up has several features which are convenient for our analysis. In the first place, it is wide-ranging. Evaluations are conducted in every academic field and at two

different stages of the career ladder, associate and full professorships. Second, committee members are randomly selected from a pool of eligible evaluators. This provides a credible and transparent empirical strategy for identifying a causal impact of committee composition on application behavior. Third, researchers need to pre-register their application before the composition of the committee is known, allowing us to observe a list of prospective candidates independently of whether they finally apply or not. The list of prospective applicants helps us to focus on the group of individuals who revealed to be interested in being considered for promotion. Finally, we observe the curriculum vitae of all potential candidates and evaluators, as well as evaluators' reports, in two consecutive rounds of evaluations. We use this information to disentangle potential mechanisms underlying the impact of connections on researchers' application decisions.

Our database includes information on around 69,000 applications of researchers who pre-registered in 2012 for the first round of the national qualification evaluation. Following the announcement of the identity of panel members, around 10,000 applications were withdrawn. The remaining 59,000 applications were evaluated by a five-member evaluation committee, and 40% managed to qualify. We consider two possible links between pre-registered candidates and eligible evaluators: prior co-authorship of an academic article (*coauthors*) or common current affiliation (*colleagues*).

To guide our empirical analysis, we propose a simple theoretical framework. The existence of an evaluation premium may increase the application rate of connected individuals. On the other hand, the informational advantage of connected individuals may have a positive or a negative impact on application decisions, depending on the magnitude of application costs.

We find that the application rate is significantly lower among pre-registered researchers who, by the luck of the draw, are assigned to a committee that includes a coauthor or a colleague. The probability that they apply is three percentage points (p.p.) lower than in the case of non-connected pre-registered researchers. The effect is driven by connected researchers with a weak research profile. At the same time,

connected researchers tend to be more successful, both conditional and unconditional on applying. Their success rate is 4.5 p.p. (13%) higher relative to other comparable researchers pre-registered for the evaluation. Partly, this is due to the stronger support that they receive from their connections. Information from 300,000 individual evaluations (five per applicant) shows that, within each committee, connected candidates tend to receive more favorable evaluations from their coauthors and colleagues, relative to the assessments they receive from other committee members. This connection premium is similar across individuals with different levels of research quality.

Overall, the lower application rate and the higher success rate of connected individuals is consistent with connected candidates being better informed about their chances of success in a context where the application costs are limited, and with the existence of connection premium in evaluations. The information channel seems to dominate at the application stage leading to a positive selection of connected individuals among applicants.

We also examine a potential alternative explanation for why connected researchers are less likely to apply and more likely to succeed. A majority of connected researchers may benefit from a positive evaluation premium, but a few expect to be penalized by their connections and decide not to apply. However, the evidence does not support this hypothesis. Connected researchers who chose not to apply in the first evaluation round are more likely to reapply and to succeed in the following round of the national assessment, which took place one year later and was carried out by the same committee members. They also tend to receive more favorable evaluations from their connections in the committee relative to the assessments that they receive from other reviewers. In sum, there is no indication that the lower application rate of connected researchers is driven by their fear of a less favorable evaluation. Instead, their informational advantage at the application stage seems to have helped connected researchers with a weak profile to optimize the timing of their applications.

Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. Most of the previous literature has focused on the direct impact of professional networks on productivity

and on evaluations. We show that connections also help to make better professional choices and this information may be valuable in contexts where applications are costly and the outcome of the evaluation is subject to uncertainty, such as applying for a grant, for a position, or selecting the outlet for submitting an academic paper. This informational feature of connections might also partly explain the large success of some mentoring programs (e.g., Blau et al. 2010).

Our results also have important implications for empirical studies of evaluation biases and discrimination that rely on observational data. According to our analysis, when prospective candidates can observe the identity of evaluators and applications are costly, self-selection may be a major concern and it might bias estimates. In the context considered in our paper, connected individuals are positively selected among applicants, and taking into account only information on actual applicants leads to an overestimation of the connection premium by 26%, despite the availability of an extensive set of controls which accounts for about half of the variation in evaluations. A similar problem may arise in other contexts. For instance, Fisman, Shi, Wang, and Xu (2017) examine the election of fellows of the Chinese Academies of Sciences and Engineering, and document that the success rate of applicants who share hometown ties with evaluators is 39% higher than other applicants with a similar publication record, a gap that the authors attribute to favoritism. This estimate may be upward biased if applications costs were relatively low and connected researchers were better informed about their chances of success. Naturally, the estimate may also be downward biased if prospective candidates could anticipate strong favoritism at the application stage. The problem is not limited to the analysis of connections in academia; it might also be relevant for studies assessing evaluation biases related to gender, ethnic group, social ties or reputation (e.g., Fernandez and Weinberg 1997; Goldin and Rouse 2000; Petersen, Saporta and Seidel 2000, 2005, Card and DellaVigna 2017). The direction of self-selection in these studies is hard to predict, and it will depend on the strength of evaluation biases, the degree of information asymmetries, the cost of failure, and the quality of prospective applicants.

Our results may also be relevant for a better understanding of the benefits of hiring through employee referrals. According to the literature, referred applicants are more likely to accept job offers, and they are also substantially less likely to quit (Simon and Warner 1992, Burks et al. 2015). The standard explanation is that employers are better informed about the quality of referred applicants. Additionally, it might also be that connected individuals are better informed not only about the existence of the vacancy but also about the quality of the match.

Finally, the endogenous self-selection of candidates may also be relevant for the interpretation of audit and correspondence studies. In these studies, fictitious applicants look identical “on paper” except for some particular characteristic such as gender or race. As pointed out by Heckman and Siegelman (1993) and Neumark (2012), an evaluator’s decision to select applicants from a particular group may reflect either taste discrimination or statistical discrimination. Our analysis suggests that statistical discrimination may occur even if the two groups have an identical distribution of quality in the overall population, but one group is better informed about the evaluation process or the characteristics of the job. Evaluators may expect applicants from these two groups to differ due to self-selection.¹

2 Theoretical framework

To guide our empirical analysis, we develop a stylized conceptual framework of the application decision process. The model aims to capture three relevant features. First, applications may involve some costs, either in the form of specific investments or opportunity costs. Second, evaluators may be biased in favor of acquainted candidates. Third, there may be information asymmetries both on the evaluators’ side and on the researchers’ side. Evaluators may observe the quality of candidates imperfectly

¹Incidentally, this might perhaps explain the results in Milkman, Akinola and Chugh (2015), who conduct an audit study in which fictional prospective students contact professors in order to discuss research opportunities before applying to a doctoral program. Faculty members are significantly less responsive to students with a foreign-sounding name even if, by construction, their messages were otherwise identical. A possible explanation, within the framework of our study, is that employers prejudge native prospective students to be better informed about their fit and, as a result, they foresee that they will be positively selected among students who decide to contact the faculty.

and, likewise, prospective candidates may not be well informed about evaluators' standards. These information asymmetries are lower when the evaluator and the candidate are connected.

The model illustrates that the impact of connections on application decisions is ambiguous. If evaluators are positively biased towards connected researchers, these researchers will have a stronger incentive to apply. However, if connections also convey information to potential applicants on evaluation standards or if they provide information to evaluators on the quality of candidates, connections may either increase or decrease the probability of applying. As we explain below, the direction of the effect depends on the extent of information asymmetries, evaluators' priors about applicants quality, and the cost associated with the application.

2.1 Benchmark

We start with a benchmark case where there are no information asymmetries or biases. The evaluation process has the following time structure. First, an individual i (he) and an evaluator j (she) are randomly drawn from the population of prospective candidates and eligible evaluators. Second, individual i decides whether to apply for an evaluation. Let $a_i = 1$ if the candidate applies, and $a_i = 0$ otherwise. Finally, if candidate i applies, evaluator j decides whether he qualifies or not. Let $s_{ij} = 1$ if the candidate is promoted, and $s_{ij} = 0$ if he is not.

Prospective candidates differ in terms of their quality, q_i . A proportion $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ of prospective candidates have quality equal to one, while $1 - \alpha$ have quality equal to zero. Eligible evaluators differ in terms of their evaluation standards, u_j . A share $\beta \in (0, 1)$ of evaluators have high standards, u_h , and the rest have low standards, u_l , where $1 > u_h > 0 > u_l$. Candidates and evaluators are assumed to be risk-neutral.

If an individual applies and fails, he incurs a cost $C > 0$. The net gain of applying and qualifying is equal to one, and if an individual does not apply his payoff is equal

to zero. The payoff of the prospective candidate can be described as follows:

$$U_i := a_i[s_{ij} - (1 - s_{ij})C].$$

The payoff of the evaluator is equal to the quality of candidate i if she promotes him, and it is equal to u_j if the candidate fails:

$$U_j := s_{ij}q_i - (1 - s_{ij})u_j.$$

When the evaluator has low standards ($u_j = u_l$), she promotes all candidates independently of their quality. When the evaluation threshold is high ($u_j = u_h$), the evaluator promotes only high-quality candidates. Consequently, prospective applicants only apply when their quality is high or when the evaluator has a low evaluation standard. Overall, the probability that a prospective candidate applies is:

$$p(a_i = 1) = \alpha + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta), \quad (1)$$

and the expected quality of applicants is equal to:

$$E(q_i | a_i = 1) = \frac{\alpha}{\alpha + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta)}. \quad (2)$$

All applicants get promoted. Therefore, unconditional on his application decision, the probability that a prospective candidate gets promoted is equal to:

$$p(s_{ij} = 1) = \alpha + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta), \quad (3)$$

which is also equal to his expected payoff:

$$E(U_i) = \alpha + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta). \quad (4)$$

2.2 Connections

Let us consider two different groups of individuals, connected and unconnected, and let us assume that these two groups are drawn from the same population. We investigate how connections affect application decisions and evaluation outcomes in three different scenarios: (i) evaluators are biased in favor of connected candidates, (ii) evaluators are better informed about the quality of connected candidates, (iii) connected candidates are better informed about evaluation standards. We discuss below each scenario and we summarize the main results in Table 1.

2.2.1 Evaluation bias in favor of connected candidates.

To formalize the existence of bias in favor of connected candidates, let us assume that the evaluator's payoff is equal to $U_j = s_{ij}(q_i + B * I_{ij}) - (1 - s_{ij})u_j$, where I_{ij} is an indicator function that takes value one if individual i has a connection with evaluator j . For simplicity, we assume that the bias in favor of connected applicants is sufficiently large to guarantee that they always succeed, independently of their own quality or whether the evaluator has high or low standards ($B > u_h$).

In this setup, connected individuals always apply and succeed. Instead, as in the benchmark case, unconnected individuals only apply if they belong to the high-quality type or if they are low-quality and the evaluator has low standards (see equation (1)). As shown in the upper panel of Table 1, connected candidates tend to be negatively selected among applicants. The expected quality of connected applicants is equal to α , which is lower than the expected quality of unconnected ones. Moreover, connected individuals are more likely to be promoted, and they have a higher payoff.

2.2.2 Information asymmetries on the evaluator side

Let us consider now the case when there are no evaluation biases, but there exist information asymmetries regarding the quality of unconnected candidates. For simplicity, we assume that evaluators observe perfectly the quality of connected candidates, but they do not observe the quality of unconnected ones.

Connected individuals behave as in the benchmark case. The application decision of unconnected individuals depends on how selective is the process. When the degree of selectivity is low ($\alpha > u_h$), all evaluators are willing to promote unconnected candidates and, anticipating that, all unconnected individuals apply and get promoted. On the contrary, when the process is selective ($u_l < \alpha \leq u_h$), only low-standard evaluators would be willing to promote unconnected candidates. Therefore, unconnected individuals only apply if the evaluator has low grading standards:

$$p(a_i = 1 | I_{ij} = 0) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \alpha > u_h, \\ 1 - \beta & \text{if } \alpha \leq u_h. \end{cases}$$

As in the previous case, all applicants qualify, and the probability of success and the payoffs are similar to the probability of applying.

The second panel of Table 1 compares the situation of connected and unconnected individuals. When the process is not selective, unconnected individuals benefit from the information asymmetry. They are relatively more likely to apply and also to qualify. On the contrary, when the process is selective, the information asymmetry hurts unconnected individuals. In this case, they have a lower probability to apply and to succeed.²

2.2.3 Information asymmetries on the candidate side

Finally, let us consider the existence of information asymmetries regarding the evaluation standards: while connected individuals observe the standards of the evaluator, unconnected ones cannot.

Connected individuals behave as in the benchmark case. High-quality individuals always apply, and low-quality ones only apply when they observe that evaluation standards are low. Unconnected individuals cannot condition their application on evaluation standards. They always apply if their quality is high, but the behavior of

²This result is essentially similar to the findings of the seminal models of statistical discrimination by Aigner and Cain (1977) and Cornell and Welch (1996).

low-quality ones depends on the cost of failure. They only apply if the costs associated with failure are low enough relative to the expected benefits of winning ($C < \frac{1-\beta}{\beta}$). The *ex ante* probability that unconnected candidates apply is:

$$p(a_i = 1 | I_{ij} = 0) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } C < \frac{1-\beta}{\beta}, \\ \alpha & \text{if } C \geq \frac{1-\beta}{\beta}. \end{cases}$$

We compare the situation of connected and unconnected individuals in the lower panel of Table 1. When costs are low, connected individuals are relatively less likely to apply, and they tend to be positively selected among applicants. On the contrary, when costs are high, connected individuals are more likely to apply, and they tend to be negatively selected among applicants.

The expected payoff of connected individuals is always higher. They apply if and only if they qualify. Instead, unconnected individuals are hurt by the lack of information. When costs are low, some low-quality individuals apply and face high evaluation standards. Instead, when costs are high, some low-quality individuals fail to apply even if standards are low, foregoing the benefits associated with promotion.

The above model highlights that the impact of connections on candidates' application behavior depends on the underlying content of these connections. If connections imply a positive evaluation bias, connected candidates are relatively more likely to apply and to succeed, and they tend to be negatively selected into the application. However, if connections decrease information asymmetries between the candidate and the evaluator, the impact of connections on application behavior becomes ambiguous.

If there are information asymmetries about applicants' quality, the impact of connections depends on how selective is the evaluation. When evaluators are not selective, connected individuals are less likely to apply than unconnected ones, and they also have lower chances of success. However, when evaluators are selective, connected candidates benefit from the availability of better information about their own quality, and they are more likely to apply and also to succeed.

There may also be information asymmetries about evaluators' standards. In this case, application behavior depends crucially on the cost of applying and failing. When the cost is sufficiently low, connected individuals are less likely to apply than unconnected ones. On the contrary, when the cost of applying is high, connected individuals are more likely to apply.

3 Background

Most Italian universities are public, and the recruitment of full and associate professors is regulated by national laws.³ Before 2010, recruitment procedures were managed locally by each university. In 2010, a two-stage procedure similar to those already in place in other European countries was approved (e.g., France and Spain).⁴ In the first stage, candidates to associate professor and full professor positions are required to qualify in a national-level evaluation known as the National Scientific Qualification (*Abilitazione Scientifica Nazionale*). Evaluations are conducted separately in 184 scientific fields designed by the Ministry of Education. A positive assessment is valid for four years while a negative one implies a ban on participating in further national evaluations during the following two years. Qualified candidates can participate in the second stage, which is managed locally by each university.

3.1 The National Scientific Qualification

The first National Scientific Qualification was performed between 2012 and 2014.⁵ The timeline of the process is described in Figure 1. The call for eligible evaluators was published in June 2012. The deadline for professors to volunteer to be an evaluator was August 28. In the meantime, the call for candidates' applications was issued in July. Candidates had to pre-register online by November 20. The submission package

³According to OECD (2013), in 2011 about 92% of students in tertiary education were enrolled in 66 public universities and the remaining 8% in 29 independent private institutions.

⁴Law number 240/2010, also known as "Gelmini reform" after the name of the minister of Education.

⁵A detailed description of the process is available at <http://abilitazione.miur.it/public/index.php?lang=eng>, retrieved on February 2014.

included the CV and up to 20 selected publications. Researchers were able to pre-register to multiple fields and positions.

Once the application deadline for candidates was closed, committee members were selected by random draw from the pool of eligible evaluators in the corresponding field. These lotteries were held between late November 2012 and February 2013. The same committee had to evaluate candidates for associate and full professorships. Following their appointment, each evaluation committee had to draft and to publish online a document describing the general criteria that would be used to grant positive evaluations.⁶ This process often took several months.

Pre-registered candidates could withdraw their application at any point of time between the selection of committee members and two weeks after the public announcement of the evaluation criteria. When the list of applicants was finally closed, evaluation committees were informed about the identity of candidates and the examination took place.

Below we explain in more detail how committee members were selected and the evaluation process.

3.2 Selection of committees

The pool of eligible evaluators includes full professors in the corresponding field who have volunteered for the task and satisfy some minimum quality requirements. There

⁶In order to elaborate the document describing the general evaluation criteria, committee members had to meet, discuss their individual criteria and find a compromise. Depending on the level of agreement between the evaluators, this document could be more or less informative about the criteria to be used for evaluation. For instance, in Econometrics the committee announced that “(i)n order to assess the scientific maturity of the candidates, the Committee will give prominent weight to the evaluation of their scientific publications, especially those published in top journals. The publications will be evaluated on the basis of their originality, innovativeness, methodological rigor, international reach and impact, and relevance for the field. In order to assess journal articles, the Committee may use the classification of journals provided by ANVUR and the bibliometric indicators provided by Web of Science and Scopus. The Committee may also use information regarding the impact of each publication and the total number of citations received by the candidate.” A committee in Political Economy stated that “a sufficient condition to obtain a qualification for associate professorship is to satisfy at least one of the following requirements (based on the publications in the previous 10 years): 1) have at least 2 articles in A-journals as defined by the evaluation agency, 2) have at least 3 articles in scientific journals included in the database Web of Science, Social Science Citation Index, Economics, 3) have at least 5 articles in scientific journals included in database Scopus, Economics, Econometrics and Finance.”

are 184 officially defined fields. Fields in math, engineering, and natural and life sciences require a research production which is above the median for full professors in the field and which is present in at least two of the following three dimensions: (i) the number of articles published in scientific journals covered by ISI Web of Science, (ii) the number of citations, (iii) and the H-index.⁷ In the social sciences and the humanities, eligible evaluators are required to have a research production above the median in at least one of the following three dimensions: (i) the number of articles published in high quality scientific journals (in what follows, A-journals),⁸ (ii) the overall number of articles published in any scientific journals and book chapters, and (iii) the number of published books.

Eligible evaluators may be based in Italy (hereafter ‘Italian’) and may also be affiliated to a university from an OECD country (hereafter ‘international’). International and Italian eligible evaluators have to satisfy the same research requirements, but their remuneration differs. While ‘Italian’ evaluators work *pro bono*, OECD evaluators receive €16,000 for their participation.

Evaluation committees include five members. Four members are randomly drawn from the pool of eligible Italian evaluators, under the constraint that no university can have more than one evaluator within the committee. The fifth member is typically selected from the pool of eligible international evaluators. Exceptionally, whenever the pool of international professors includes less than four professors, all five committee members are drawn from the pool of eligible evaluators based in Italy. The randomization procedure leaves little room for manipulation. Eligible reviewers in each field are ordered alphabetically and are assigned a number according to their position. A sequence of numbers is then randomly selected. The same sequence is applied to select committee members in a number of different fields.

Evaluators are in charge for two rounds of the national scientific qualification. If an

⁷More precisely, this rule applies to Mathematics and IT, Physics, Chemistry, Earth Sciences, Biology, Medicine, Agricultural and Veterinary Sciences, Civil Engineering and Architecture (with the exception of Design, Architectural and Urban design, Drawing, Architectural Restoration, and Urban and Regional Planning), Industrial and Information Engineering, and Psychology.

⁸An evaluation agency and several scientific committees determined the set of high-quality journals in each field.

evaluator resigns, a substitute reviewer is selected randomly from the corresponding group of eligible evaluators.

3.3 The evaluation

The evaluations are (officially) based only on candidates' CVs and publications. There are no oral or written tests or interviews. Committee members meet periodically to discuss their assessments and cast their votes. A positive assessment requires a qualified majority of four positive votes (out of five committee members). Only kinship relationships between evaluators and candidates are officially subject to the conflict of interest rule. In these cases, the evaluator cannot participate in the deliberation and the voting decision. Notably, coauthors and colleagues are not affected by the conflict of interest rules.

Committees have full autonomy on the exact criteria to be used in the evaluation. Nonetheless, it is important to point out that an independent evaluation agency (ANVUR), appointed by the Ministry, collected and publicized information on the research productivity of all candidates in the previous ten years. This productivity was first measured by the same three bibliometric indicators employed to select evaluators and was then normalized by taking into account the amount of time passed since first publication and also the number of job interruptions (this last typically related to parental leave). The evaluation agency also used these bibliometric dimensions to provide the average research productivity of professors in those categories to which candidates might apply. Committees are not obliged, though encouraged, to use this information. Since the whole system of national evaluations was new for Italian academia, *ex ante* there was uncertainty regarding the evaluation criteria that could be adopted by committees.

At the end of the process, committees provide each candidate with (i) the final outcome of the evaluation (pass or failure), (ii) a collective report explaining the criteria used by the committee and how they reached their final decision and (iii) five individual reports explaining each evaluators' position. Figure (2) provides a sample

of an individual evaluation report.

3.4 Following the evaluation

Applicants who received a positive evaluation could apply for a position at the university level. The number of openings was relatively limited, at least, initially. By December 2015 only 29% of qualified candidates had been promoted at the university level.

Candidates who failed to qualify had to skip two evaluation rounds before they could apply again. Candidates who did not apply could apply the following year to be evaluated by the same committee or to wait for the future evaluation rounds with different committees.

In practice, the system experienced several changes after the second evaluation round, and the third round was delayed for several years. The new call for candidates was announced only in the fall of 2016.

4 Data

We consider all evaluations held within the first two rounds of the *National Scientific Qualification*. The database includes examinations for associate and full professorships in 184 academic fields. We describe below the available information on (i) the pool of eligible and actual evaluators; (ii) the pool of pre-registered and actual applicants and (iii) the evaluation outcome.⁹

4.1 Evaluators

Around six thousand professors, all based in Italy, volunteered and qualified to be in the pool of eligible evaluators. The number of professors in the pool of eligible evaluators based abroad was slightly above one thousand. In the average field, the pool of eligible

⁹We collected the CVs of prospective candidates and evaluators and the final evaluations from the webpage of the Ministry of Education. To avoid problems with homonymity, we have excluded 14 candidates that had the same name and surname as other candidates within the same field and rank.

evaluators includes 32 Italian professors and eight international professors.

Table 2 provides some descriptive information on eligible evaluators. The average CV includes around 131 research outputs, mostly journal articles (73), book chapters (22), and conference proceedings (20). The average CV also includes 0.42 patents. As a proxy for the quality of journal articles, we have collected information on the quality of the journals in which they were published. In social sciences and humanities, we use the official list of A-journals that was compiled by the Italian evaluation agency. This list includes approximately 7,000 academic journals. In sciences, we consider the *Article Influence Score* (AIS) of journals.¹⁰

About 8% of Italian evaluators drawn in the initial lottery resigned and were replaced by other (randomly selected) eligible evaluators. The resignation rate was slightly higher among international reviewers (10%).¹¹

4.2 Applications

More than 46,000 researchers pre-registered in the first round of the national scientific qualification. This accounts for around 61% of assistant professors and 60% of associate professors in Italy.¹² One-third of candidates registered in several fields (e.g.: qualification to full professorship in Political Economy and qualification to full professorship in Applied Economics) or in different categories of the same field (e.g., qualification to full and associate professorships in Political Economy). In total there were 69,020 pre-registered applications, approximately 375 per field.

In the upper panel of Table 3, columns 1 and 2 provide information on the characteristics of the initial set of pre-registered applications. The average CV has 16 pages and, it reports 64 research outputs, mostly journal articles (37). It also includes some

¹⁰This indicator is available for all publications in the Thomson Reuters Web of Knowledge. It is related to *Impact Factor*, but it takes into account the quality of the citing journals, the propensity to cite across journals and it excludes self-citations. The average journal is normalized to have AIS equal to one.

¹¹In two fields where the international member of the committee resigned, the pool of international evaluators included originally just four members. In these two cases, given that the pool of remaining eligible evaluators was lower than four, the replacement was selected from the Italian pool.

¹²These figures are based on our own calculations using information from the Italian Ministry of Education on the identity of all assistant (*Ricercatori*) and associate professors (*Associati*) in Italy on December 31, 2012.

books (2), book chapters (7), conference proceedings (10), and patents (0.24). A typical paper is coauthored by six authors, with only 34% of papers being single authored. The candidate reports being the first author in 22% of the occasions. Columns 3 and 4 distinguish between candidates to a position of full and associate professor. Not surprisingly, candidates to full professor positions have a relatively longer publication record: 89 vs. 53 publications. In social sciences and humanities, the average candidate for a position of full professor has published six articles in A-journals; applicants to associate professorships have published only three. In sciences, the average AIS of papers published by candidates for a position of full professor is around 1.31; it is similar for candidates to associate professorships. We have also constructed a proxy for the timing of the application. We use the application code number, which reflects the ordering of application, and we normalize this variable uniformly between 0 and 1 for applicants within the same list. This measure might perhaps be correlated with candidates' quality or with their self-confidence.

Some applications were withdrawn by applicants when the identity of evaluators and the general evaluation criteria were revealed. For the final set of applications, the evaluation agency of the Ministry of Education constructed and published online information on candidates' research production during the ten previous years measured along three bibliometric dimensions described earlier. The evaluation agency also compared candidates research output with the median in the corresponding field and position. This information is summarized in the lower panel of Table 3. Around 38% of the final candidacies were above the median in each of the three dimensions. On the other end of the scale, 16% were below the median in every dimension.

4.3 Connections

We consider two types of links between candidates and evaluators: coauthorships and affiliation to the same institution. Approximately 12% of pre-registered candidates were assigned to a committee including a colleague and around 7% to a committee

including a coauthor.¹³ In about a third of the cases, the coauthor also belongs to the same university.

In the National Scientific Qualification, coauthors and colleagues are not formally subject to a conflict of interest rule. Nonetheless, committees might autonomously decide to self-impose their own additional restrictions. According to our analysis of the evaluation reports, evaluators voluntarily abstained in the presence of a colleague or a coauthor in only three fields (out of a total 184).¹⁴

Pre-registered candidates with a connection in the evaluation committee, either a colleague or coauthor, tend to have a significantly better research profile relative to the rest of the candidates (columns 5-7, Table 3). Connected candidates excel both in quantity and quality of research.¹⁵

4.4 Evaluations

Table 4 provides information on the outcome of the evaluation process. The upper panel shows information on the first round of evaluations. Out of the initial set of 69,020 pre-registered applications, approximately 14% were withdrawn and did not receive an evaluation, 49% failed the evaluation, and 37% were successful. Success is strongly correlated with candidates' observable research productivity. As shown in Figure 3, among actual candidates whose quality was below the median in every dimension only 4% managed to succeed, compared to a 63% success rate among candidates who excelled in all three dimensions.

Each committee member writes an individual evaluation report for each application. Overall there are approximately 295,000 individual reports.¹⁶ The average report includes around 176 words; it briefly describes the research production of the candi-

¹³Information on connections is only available for evaluators based in Italy.

¹⁴These three fields are Ecology (sector 05/C1), Pediatrics (06/G1) and Management (13/B2). As a result, 84 candidates in these fields received only four evaluation reports.

¹⁵We also observe that junior researchers from Italian departments that have more eligible evaluators among senior colleagues are more likely to pre-register for an evaluation before the final composition of committees is known. It may be because they anticipate a higher chance of having a connection on the evaluation panel, but it may also reflect a positive association between the quality of the senior and the junior faculty at the department level.

¹⁶Due to a technical problem, we are missing information on evaluation reports of 202 applications.

date and provides some discussion about its quality and its fit with the field. It also indicates the evaluator’s final assessment on whether the candidate deserves qualification. We have conducted a text analysis of these reports in order to identify the final assessment. On most occasions, the final decision was reached unanimously by all five evaluators (86%). Overall, 45% of votes were favorable to the candidate and 55% were negative.

Those candidates who had withdrawn the application in the first round of evaluations had a chance to participate in the second round, which was conducted the following year and was evaluated by the same committees. Around 37% of these candidates chose to reapply. Out of the group of those who had reapplied, 58% managed to qualify.¹⁷

Candidates who qualify in the National Scientific Qualification can later apply for a promotion at the university level. Out of all researchers who pre-registered for the first round of evaluations and who qualified for the corresponding position either in the first or the second round, by December 2015 about 35% had been promoted to an associate professor position and 11% had been promoted to a full professor position.

5 Empirical analysis

Our two measures of connections, coauthors and colleagues, may capture different dimensions. Colleagues are in general expected to be close in social terms but not necessarily intellectually. They might have private information on candidates’ contribution to professional service and, sometimes, they might be perhaps directly affected by the outcome of the evaluation. Coauthors are probably closer both in the social space and the ideas space. Nonetheless, in what follows, given that we find that empirically the impact of coauthors and colleagues is practically identical, we report the effect of both types of connections jointly.

The structure of this section is as follows. First, we estimate the causal effect of

¹⁷In this second round, we have obtained information on the final assessment for all candidates, but we collected individual evaluation reports only in those fields that had completed evaluations by May 2015 (116 out of 184 fields).

connections upon researchers’ application decisions and their impact on evaluators’ assessments (sections 5.1 and 5.2). Then, using the conceptual framework presented in section 2, we examine which of the three mechanisms considered – bias, informed evaluators or informed applicants – are consistent with the evidence (section 5.3). In section 5.4, we investigate the empirical relevance of self-selection, and we quantify the bias incurred by an analysis that estimates the impact of connections on evaluations using only information on actual applicants. Finally, we examine the longer-term effects of connections (sections 5.5 and 5.6) and discuss the external validity of our results (section 5.7).

5.1 The impact of connections on applications

According to the conceptual framework presented in section 2, if evaluators are biased in favor of connected candidates, this would encourage researchers with a connection in the committee to apply. Moreover, we would expect connected candidates to be negatively selected among applicants. On the other hand, if connections reduce information asymmetries, their impact on application decisions is ambiguous and depends on how selective is the process and on how large is the cost of failing relative to the gains.

As shown in Table 3, researchers who have a connection in the evaluation committee tend to have a stronger research profile and, presumably, might also differ in some unobserved dimensions. In order to estimate the causal impact of connections on researchers’ application decisions, we identify exogenous variations in the availability of a connection in the committee exploiting the random selection of its members. We compare the application behavior of pre-registered researchers who initially have similar chances of having a connection in the committee but, due to the random draw, differ in terms of the actual number of connections that they end up having in the evaluation committee:

$$y_{i,c} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Connections}_{i,c} + \mathbf{D}_{i,c} \beta_2 + \mu_c + \epsilon_{i,c}, \quad (5)$$

where $y_{i,c}$ is a dummy variable that takes value one if researcher i who pre-registered for evaluation in exam c (e.g., qualification for an associate professorship in Econometrics) applies. $\mathbf{D}_{i,c}$ represents a set of indicator variables for the number of connections that researcher i expects to have in committee c before the random selection takes place.¹⁸ $Connections_{i,c}$ indicates the number of committee members selected in the initial random draw who have coauthored with the candidate or who are affiliated to the same institution (typically zero or one). Note that a few evaluators (8%) resigned and were replaced by other (randomly chosen) eligible evaluators and, as a result, the number of connections in the initial committee might differ slightly from the final composition of the committee at the time of the evaluation. Therefore, in the baseline specification coefficient β_1 captures the so-called intention-to-treat effect (ITT).

To increase the accuracy of the estimation, we include in the equation a set of exam fixed effects (μ_c), accounting for possible differences in the average success rate across different fields and positions. In some additional specifications, we also control for the set of predetermined individual characteristics and quality indicators listed in Table 3 (\mathbf{X}_i). In all regressions, standard errors are clustered at the field level, thus reflecting that evaluations within each field are done by the same committee.

The key identifying assumption of the analysis is that the composition decided by the initial random draw should not be correlated with any relevant observable or unobservable characteristic of researchers. The way in which the randomization was implemented suggests that there was little room for manipulation. Nonetheless, we explicitly test the randomness of the assignment. We estimate a specification similar to equation (5), but we consider as dependent variables all observable predetermined characteristics of individual i (x_i). As shown in Table 5, the results from these ran-

¹⁸If there were no restrictions on the randomization procedure, the expected number of connections in the committee would be the proportion of connected evaluators in the pool of eligible evaluations times the number of evaluators in the committee. In practice, the rule of the draw limited to one the number of evaluators in the same committee from the same university. In order to take this restriction into account, we have computed the expected committee composition as an average of one million simulated draws of five committee members from the pool of eligible evaluators, substituting eventual cases of multiple evaluators from the same university with other random draws. We have then rounded the expected committee composition to two decimal places and created indicator variables for each value. All results, are practically identical if we control for the expected number of connections using a linear specification instead of a set of dummies.

domization tests are consistent with the assignment being random. Researchers who obtain, through the luck of the draw, a connection in the evaluation committee are statistically similar to other researchers. There are ten coefficients that capture the correlation between the random shock to committee composition and researchers' characteristics, and only one of these coefficients is statistically significant at the 10% level. The existence of random assignment is confirmed by the corresponding F-test for the joint significance of the estimates.

The upper panel of Table 6 reports the main estimates from equation (5). Researchers are significantly less likely to apply when they are assigned, through the luck of the draw, to a committee that includes a connection. The presence of a coauthor or a colleague in the initial committee decreases the probability of applying by 2.7 p.p. (column 1). As expected, these estimates are unchanged when we control for predetermined individual characteristics and observable productivity (column 2).

In column 3, we measure the presence of connections in final committees formed after a few randomly selected evaluators resigned and were replaced. To account for the potentially endogenous replacement of some of the evaluators, we instrument the final composition of committees using the initial composition that was determined by the random draw. The instrumental variable (IV) estimate is slightly larger in absolute terms than ITT, but the magnitudes are statistically similar in the two cases. The presence of a connection in the committee decreases by 3.0 p.p. the probability that the pre-registered candidate goes ahead with his application. This amounts to a 3.5% decrease in the application rate relative to a baseline application rate of 86% or, equivalently, a 22% increase in the probability of withdrawal relative to a baseline withdrawal rate of 14%.

We also analyze how application decisions vary depending on researchers' observable quality (columns 4-6). We split the sample into three groups based on researchers' publication record. In science, technology, engineering, mathematics, and medicine (STEM&Med fields), we classify prospective applicants based on their total Article Influence Score and in social sciences and humanities we use the number of A-journal

publications. The impact of connections on applications is driven by the decisions of researchers with weaker research profile. Connections do not have any significant impact on the application decisions of researchers in the top tercile but, for researchers in the lowest tercile, the presence of a coauthor or a colleague in the committee decreases the likelihood to apply by about 6.2 p.p (7.8%).

5.2 The impact of connections on researchers' chances of success

We compare the success rate of connected and unconnected researchers in the first round of national qualification evaluations, exploiting the random assignment of evaluators to committees. We estimate equation (5) using as dependent variable an indicator which takes value one if pre-registered candidate i qualifies in examination c and value zero if he failed or withdrew the application. As shown in column 1 of panel B in Table 6, the presence of a coauthor or a colleague in the committee increases by 3.9 p.p. the probability of success of pre-registered candidates (or by 11% relative to the baseline success rate of 34%). The inclusion of individual controls increases threefold the explained variation in the dependent variable – the adjusted R-squared increases from 11% to 31% – but, as expected, it does not affect the point estimates significantly (column 2). The estimates are slightly larger, around 4.5 p.p., although statistically similar, when we instrument the final composition of the committee using the initial one (column 3). We also examine how the impact of connections on success varies depending on researchers' observable research productivity (columns 4-6). Better-published researchers benefit more from connections. Researchers in the top (bottom) tercile experience a 5.3 p.p. (3.0 p.p.) increase in their success rate when the committee includes a coauthor or a colleague.

Connected candidates are significantly less likely to apply, but they have significantly higher unconditional success rates. This necessarily implies that their chances of failing an exam are substantially lower. In fact, as shown in column 7, the probability that candidates with a coauthor or a colleague in the committee apply and receive

a negative assessment is 7.5 p.p. lower. Candidates with a weaker research profile benefit more from this decrease in failure rates. In the bottom tercile, the failure rate of connected candidates is 9.2 p.p. lower than the failure rate of other candidates, compared to a decrease of 6.1 p.p. for connected candidates in the top tercile (columns 4-6).

In sum, the extent to which candidates are affected by the presence of a connection in the committee depends on the quality of these same candidates. Top candidates face a larger increase in success rates. On the other hand, candidates with a relatively weaker research profile experience a larger decrease in application rates.

5.2.1 Individual evaluation reports

We now turn to the information provided by evaluators' individual assessments. We compare the assessments received by the same candidate from different evaluators:

$$y_{i,j,c} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Connection}_{i,j} + \mu_i + \lambda_j + \epsilon_{i,j,c}, \quad (6)$$

where $y_{i,j,c}$ is a dummy variable that takes value one if evaluator j voted in favor of candidate i 's application in qualification exam c . $\text{Connection}_{i,j}$ is a dummy variable indicating whether the candidate and the evaluator have coauthored in the past or they are based in the same institution. A set of application fixed effects (μ_i) controls for potential differences in the characteristics of candidates. In our preferred specification, we also include evaluators' fixed effects (λ_j), which capture any potential differences in grading standards across evaluators. Coefficient β_1 captures the differences in the assessments received by each candidate from connected and unconnected evaluators, which might reflect the potential existence of differences in their evaluation criteria or the available information.

Candidates are 3.9 p.p. (9%) more likely to get a positive vote from a colleague or a coauthor, relative to the assessments they receive from other committee members (Table 7, column 1). These results are unaffected when we include evaluators' fixed effects (column 2). We also examine how the connection premium varies depending on

the observable research output of candidates (columns 3-6). The premium is always positive, and it is slightly larger for candidates of lower quality.

The nature of the decision-making may actually have biased down these estimates. A high fraction of committees reaches unanimous decisions, suggesting that there may be less disagreement reflected in these final verdicts than there would have been at interim stages. Nonetheless, given that these estimates are significantly positive, the evidence does not support the hypothesis that evaluators tend to be less favorable towards their coauthors and colleagues.

5.3 Mechanism

The presence of a coauthor or a colleague on the committee decreases the probability that researchers with a weak research profile apply. At the same time, connected candidates are relatively more likely to receive a positive vote from their connection and to succeed.

According to our theoretical framework, this pattern is consistent with three possible hypotheses. First, while connected evaluators may tend in general to favor their acquaintances (e.g., Combes et al. 2008, Perotti 2002 or Zinovyeva and Bagues 2015), in some particular cases they may be negatively biased against some of their connections (*'love or hate' hypothesis*). These researchers may anticipate that the connected evaluator is biased against them and decide to withdraw the application.¹⁹ Second, it may reflect a reduction in information asymmetries on the evaluators' side (*informed evaluators hypothesis*). Evaluators may observe more accurately the quality of connected researchers. This reduction in information asymmetries benefits high-quality connected applicants, but it decreases the chances of success of connected researchers with relatively poor quality. If these researchers anticipate their disadvantage, they may prefer not to apply. Finally, another possibility is that connected researchers enjoy a connection premium in assessments but they are also better informed about

¹⁹This hypothesis is probably more plausible in the case of colleagues than in the case of coauthors. For instance, in some universities faculty members may be associated to different chairs that hold long-standing rivalries. Contrary to this intuition, we do not observe any difference between the effect of colleagues and coauthors on application behavior and success.

the evaluation criteria of connected committees (*informed candidates hypothesis*), in a context where applying and failing is costly, but this cost is not too high. The availability of more accurate information might discourage some connected researchers from applying.

The first two explanations, the *'love or hate' hypothesis* and the *informed evaluators hypothesis*, imply that connected researchers who chose not to apply would have received relatively less favorable evaluations, had they decided to apply. On the other hand, according to the *informed candidates hypothesis*, connected researchers with a weak research profile would still have benefited from connections in case they had applied, but this advantage is not sufficient to compensate the expected cost of failure, which became more certain thanks to the presence of a connection in the committee. We try to disentangle these possible explanations by using information on researchers' performance in the second round of the qualification exams, which took place the following year. In this second round, only those researchers who had not participated in the previous evaluation were allowed to apply. Most importantly, the composition of committees did not change between the first and the second round. Therefore, if connected researchers' reason to withdraw their application in the first round was that they anticipated some disadvantage in evaluations, these expectations should also play a role in the second round of evaluations.

Around 37% of researchers who withdrew their application in the first round decided to participate in the second round. Interestingly, researchers with a coauthor or a colleague on the committee have a 4.1 p.p. (11%) higher probability of reapplying relative to other researchers who withdrew their application in the first round and, among those who reapplied, are 9.4 p.p. (17%) more likely to succeed (Table 8, columns 1 and 2). The evidence seems to suggest that, at least in the case of reapplicants, the decision to withdraw the application in the first round was not driven by these candidates experiencing a disadvantage due to the better observability of their (poor) quality by evaluators or by the existence of a negative bias against them.²⁰

²⁰Connected researchers are positively selected among the pool of applicants who withdrew their application in the first round. This might introduce an upward bias in the estimates.

The analysis of individual evaluations within committees confirms this interpretation. We observe that connected researchers who reapply tend to receive more favorable reports from their connections than from other committee members (Table 7, column 6). Overall, the evidence indicates that the withdrawal was mainly intended to improve the timing of the application.

5.4 Selection bias

We have documented that researchers take into account the composition of committees in their application decisions. In particular, the presence of a connection in a committee leads to positive selection, probably driven by connected researchers' having access to better information about their chances of success. This endogenous selection might introduce a bias in studies that estimate the impact of connections using only information on actual applicants. The consistency of such estimates relies on the assumption that the set of observable controls fully accounts for any systematic differences in the quality of connected and unconnected candidates.

Next, we try to quantify the size of this selection bias in the case of Italian evaluations. Using information from final applicants, we compare the assessments received by connected and unconnected researchers using an identification strategy based on observables:

$$y_{i,c} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Connections}_{i,c} + \mathbf{D}_{i,c} \beta_2 + \mathbf{X}_i \beta_5 + \mu_c + \epsilon_{i,c}, \quad (7)$$

where the dependent variable is an indicator that takes value one if the candidate qualifies and \mathbf{X}_i includes all observable predetermined characteristics, including applicants' research production.

Candidates with a connection in the committee are 6.6 p.p. (16.6%) more likely to qualify than other final candidates with comparable observable research outputs (Table 9, column 1). Results are similar if we consider instead the total number of positive votes received by the candidate (column 2): the presence of a coauthor or a colleague

in the committee is associated with the increase in the number of favorable votes by 0.32 (15%). The premium associated with connections does not vary depending on the research quality of candidates (columns 3-5).

As expected, the estimates provided by this ‘naive’ identification strategy based on observables overestimate the impact of connections on candidates’ chances of success. These estimates are 26% larger (16.6% vs. 13.2%) than the causal estimates that exploit the random assignment of evaluators to committees (see panel B in Table 6).

5.5 Longer-term effects of connections

One of the potential advantages of not applying when failure is likely is the possibility of applying in the following round. Next, we investigate the net impact of connections on the chances of success of connected candidates in the longer term using information from the second round of national qualification evaluations.

In what follows, we consider the first and the second round of qualification exams jointly. First, we examine the impact on applications. We estimate equation (5) using as left-hand variable an indicator that takes value one if candidate i applied either in the first or the second round (Table 10, panel A). On average, connections decrease application rates over the two rounds by 1.2 p.p. This is roughly one-third of the impact on applications in the first round, indicating that the effect of connections on applications is mostly explained by connected candidates postponing their application for one year. As we have shown in the previous sections, for the subsample of re-applicants the role of connections seems to be mainly associated with the existence of a positive bias and the reduction of uncertainty regarding the evaluation standard. However, we cannot exclude that for candidates who do not re-apply in the second round connections are associated with other dominant forces, including the ones highlighted by the *love and hate* story or the *informed evaluator* story.

We also examine the effect of connections on overall success rates over both evaluation rounds (panel B). The positive impact of connections is larger when we also take into account the second round. Considering both rounds, connected researchers are 6.2

p.p. (17%) more likely to qualify, compared to 4.5 p.p. (13%) in the first round. The difference between the mid- and short-term effect is particularly large for candidates with relatively modest research productivity (5.3 p.p. vs. 3.0 p.p.).

Next, we analyze the impact on failure rates (panel C). The presence of a connection in the committee decreases the failure rate of connected candidates by 7.4 p.p. This effect is similar to the impact of connections on candidates' failure rate in the first round, and again it is larger for candidates with relatively lower research quality (9.0 p.p. vs. 6.1 p.p.).

5.6 Promotions at the university level

A possible concern with the above analysis is that qualification in the national evaluation was a necessary but not a sufficient condition to obtain a promotion. Successful candidates have still to apply for a promotion at the university level. As a result, there exists the possibility that the above evaluations have no real impact on actual promotions.

We examine whether, beyond their impact at the qualification stage, connections in the national evaluation committee have any effect on promotions at the university level. We estimate equation (5) using as left-hand side variable an indicator for candidates who were promoted.²¹ A connection in the national committee increases the promotion probability by 1.3 p.p. (10.4%) (Table 10, panel D). The effect is mainly driven by researchers with relatively low research productivity. For this group, the connection premium is 2.1 p.p (or 55.9%). Altogether, our results indicate that committee composition and evaluation outcomes in the national evaluations do impose binding constraints on promotions at the university level.

²¹We use the official registry of tenured professors in universities as of December 2015 to identify promoted candidates. We identify changes in rank either from assistant to associate professor or from associate to full professor.

5.7 External validity

There are several threats to the external validity of our empirical estimates. Our sample includes researchers who had pre-registered for the national evaluation. The design of the evaluation excludes the possibility that other researchers that had not pre-registered apply once they learn about the composition of the committee. While we can only speculate about the size of the latter group, the available information suggests that it cannot be substantial. The pool of pre-registered applicants accounts for approximately 60% of researchers in Italy at the assistant and associate professor level, presumably those who are closer to the promotion stage. Only one-third of these researchers eventually qualified. The large number of pre-registered applicants is consistent with the relatively low cost of pre-registrations.²²

The conceptual framework presented in section 2 also suggests that the impact of connections is likely to differ in other contexts depending on the underlying strength of evaluation biases and information asymmetries, the degree of selectivity of the process, and the cost of applications and failure.

6 Conclusions

In this paper, we study how connections in evaluation committees affect application behavior. We provide a simple conceptual framework which shows that the presence of a connection in a committee may affect application decisions in a non-trivial way. Connected individuals are more likely to apply if they expect to benefit from taste or statistical discrimination at the evaluation stage. However, when connected individuals are also better informed about their chances of success and application costs are relatively low, they may be less likely to apply than unconnected individuals.

We study empirically the relevance of these channels exploiting the exceptional evidence provided by scientific evaluations in Italy. The evidence is consistent with

²²For researchers who had previously applied for a research grant of the Ministry or who had participated in another evaluation, pre-registration required only updating their official CV. For new applicants pre-registration required creating a personal account on the Ministry webpage and filling in information on publications and qualifications.

the existence of a connection premium in evaluations and also with the notion that connected individuals benefit from having access to better information which helps them to make better application decisions. This information is particularly useful for researchers with a weak research profile. We find that researchers in the bottom tercile according to their research output are 6 p.p. less likely to apply when the evaluation committee includes a coauthor or a colleague and their chances of success are 3 p.p. higher. As a result, the probability that they fail the evaluation is 9 p.p. lower. Evidence from a subsequent round of evaluations suggests that, by postponing their application, weak researchers with a connection in the committee benefit also from higher success rates in the future.

Our analysis has relevant implications for empirical studies of discrimination and evaluation biases that rely only on information on the final set of applicants. In contexts where application or failure is costly, not taking into account the potential self-selection of candidates may lead to biased estimates. The magnitude of the bias might be substantial. In the context we consider here, a naive estimation based only on applicants' information would overestimate the evaluation bias by 26%.

Finally, our findings are also relevant for the design of scientific evaluations. The Italian system of national scientific qualifications is characterized by a large degree of transparency aimed at increasing meritocracy. However, allowing prospective applicants to observe the identity of committee members may help connected individuals to take more informed application decisions and avoid costly failures. From the perspective of equality, it may be more convenient to follow the design of other institutions, such as the European Research Council, which do not disclose the identity of evaluators until the end of the evaluation process.

References

- Aigner, Dennis J. and Glen G. Cain (1977), "Statistical Theories of Discrimination in Labor Markets," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, Vol. 30(2), 175-187.

- Bagues, Manuel and Maria Jose Perez-Villadoniga (2013), “Why Do I Like People Like Me?” *Journal of Economic Theory*, Vol. 148(3), 1292-1299.
- Blau, Francine D., Janet M. Currie, Rachel T.A. Croson and Donna K. Ginther (2010), “Can Mentoring Help Female Assistant Professors? Interim Results from a Randomized Trial,” *American Economic Review*, Vol. 100(2), 348-352.
- Brogaard, Jonathan, Joseph Engelberg and Christopher A. Parsons (2014), “Network Position and Productivity: Evidence from Journal Editor Rotations,” *Journal of Financial Economics*, Vol. 111(1), 251-270.
- Burks, Stephen V., Bo Cowgill, Mitchell Hoffman, and Michael Housman (2015), “The Value of Hiring through Employee Referrals,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 130(2), 805-839.
- Card, David and Stefano DellaVigna (2017), “What do Editors Maximize? Evidence from Four Leading Economics Journals,” NBER working paper 23282.
- Combes, Pierre-Philippe, Laurent Linnemer and Michael Visser (2008), “Publish or peer-rich? The role of skills and networks in hiring economics professors,” *Labour Economics*, Vol. 15, 423-441.
- Cornell, Bradford and Ivo Welch (1996), “Culture, Information, and Screening Discrimination,” *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 104(3), pp. 542-571.
- Durante, Ruben, Giovanna Labartino, Roberto Perotti (2011), “Academic Dynasties: Decentralization and Familism in the Italian Academia,” NBER WP 7572.
- Fisman, Raymond, Jing Shi, Yongxiang Wang, and Rong Xu (2017), “Social Ties and Favoritism in Chinese Science,” NBER working paper 23130, forthcoming in the *Journal of Political Economy*.
- Fernandez, Roberto and Nancy Weinberg (1997), “Sifting and Sorting: Personal Contacts and Hiring in a Retail Bank,” *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 62(6) pp. 883-902.
- Goldin, Claudia and Cecilia Rouse (2000), “Orchestrating impartiality: The impact


- of ‘blind’ auditions on female musicians,” *American Economic Review*, Vol. 90(4), 715-741.
- Heckman, James, and Peter Siegelman (1993), ”The Urban Institute Audit Studies: Their Methods and Findings,” in *Clear and Convincing Evidence: Measurement of Discrimination in America*, ed. Fix and Struyk, 187-258. Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute Press.
- Laband, David N. and Michael J. Piette (1994), “Favoritism versus Search for Good Papers: Empirical Evidence Regarding the Behavior of Journal Editors,” *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 102(1), 194-203.
- Merton, Robert K. (1957), “Priorities in Scientific Discovery: A Chapter in the Sociology of Science,” *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 22(6), 635-659.
- Milkman, Katherine L., Modupe Akinola and Dolly Chugh (2015), “What Happens Before? A Field Experiment Exploring How Pay and Representation Differentially Shape Bias on the Pathway Into Organizations,” *Journal of Applied Psychology*, Vol. 100(6), 1678-1712.
- Neumark, David (2012), “Detecting Discrimination in Audit and Correspondence Studies,” *Journal of Human Resources*, Vol. 47(4), 1128-1157.
- OECD (2013), *Education at a Glance 2013: OECD Indicators*, OECD Publishing. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/eag-2013-en>.
- Perotti, Roberto (2002), “The Italian University System: Rules vs. Incentives,” paper presented at the First Conference on Monitoring Italy, ISAE, Rome.
- Petersen, Trond, Ishak Saporta and Marc-David Seidel (2000), “Offering a job: meritocracy and social networks,” *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 106(3), 763-816
- Petersen, Trond, Ishak Saporta and Marc-David Seidel (2005) “Getting hired: sex and race,” *Industrial Relations*, Vol. 44(3), 416-443.
- Sandström, Ulf and Martin Hällsten (2008), “Persistent nepotism in peer-review,” *Scientometrics*, Vol. 74(2), 175-189.

Simon, Curtis J. and John T. Warner (1992), "Matchmaker, Matchmaker: The Effect of Old Boy Networks on Job Match Quality, Earnings, and Tenure," *Journal of Labor Economics*, Vol. 10(3), 306-330.

Stephan, Paula E. (2010), Economics of Science. In Hall, B. H. and N. Rosenberg, *Handbook of the Economics of Innovation*, pp. 217-273. Amsterdam and New York: Elsevier.

Zinovyeva, Natalia and Manuel Bagues (2015), "The Role of Connections in Academic Promotions," *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, Vol. 7(2), 264-92.

Figure 1: Timeline of the evaluation




Note: The timeline is for Economics, discipline 13/A1.

Figure 2: Sample Individual Evaluation

FQGLj p

The candidate PINCO PALLO has been Ricercatore universitario at the Università di PISA since 2006. His scientific work is concerned with the development of democracy, including a monograph on the role of public opinion in political thought and a series of contributions concerning English and Anglo-American thought and developments from the 17th through 19th centuries, with special reference to Edmund Burke. The candidate is a member of the "Re-Imagining Democracy in the Mediterranean, 1750-1860" project, based at the University of Oxford. The candidate has a significant number of international conference participations, among which those in which the English have invited him to speak about Burke are perhaps the most indicative of a strong international reputation. In terms of specific contributions, the "silent guest" metaphor is particularly significant in explaining how Burke plays out in the history of Italian political thought. The candidate scores above the median on two of the three indicators of impact and has substantial relevant teaching experience. On the basis of the application submitted, the candidate merits approval of the request for the abilitazione scientifica.

Figure 3: Success rate and bibliometric measures



Note: Actual candidates have been classified in four groups, depending on the number of dimensions where their productivity is above the median in the corresponding category.

Table 1: Summary of theoretical results

	Unconnected individual	Connected individual
Case 1: Evaluation bias in favor of connected candidates.		
$Pr(i \text{ applies})$	$\alpha + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta)$	1
$Pr(i \text{ promoted})$	$\alpha + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta)$	1
$E(q_i i \text{ applied})$	$\frac{\alpha}{\alpha + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta)}$	α
$E(\text{Payoff}_i)$	$\alpha + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta)$	1
Case 2: Information asymmetries on the evaluator side.		
Evaluation is selective: $\alpha < u_h$		
$Pr(i \text{ applies})$	$1 - \beta$	$\alpha + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta)$
$Pr(i \text{ promoted})$	$1 - \beta$	$\alpha + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta)$
$E(q_i i \text{ applied})$	α	$\frac{\alpha}{\alpha + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta)}$
$E(\text{Payoff}_i)$	$1 - \beta$	$\alpha + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta)$
Evaluation is not selective: $\alpha > u_h$		
$Pr(i \text{ applies})$	1	$\alpha + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta)$
$Pr(i \text{ promoted})$	1	$\alpha + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta)$
$E(q_i i \text{ applied})$	α	$\frac{\alpha}{\alpha + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta)}$
$E(\text{Payoff}_i)$	1	$\alpha + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta)$
Case 3: Information asymmetries on the candidate side.		
Low application costs: $\frac{1 - \beta}{\beta} > C$		
$Pr(i \text{ applies})$	1	$\alpha + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta)$
$Pr(i \text{ promoted})$	$\alpha + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta)$	$\alpha + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta)$
$E(q_i i \text{ applied})$	α	$\frac{\alpha q_H + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta) q_L}{\alpha + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta)}$
$E(\text{Payoff}_i)$	$\alpha + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta) - (1 - \alpha)\beta C$	$\alpha + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta)$
High application costs: $\frac{1 - \beta}{\beta} < C$		
$Pr(i \text{ applies})$	α	$\alpha + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta)$
$Pr(i \text{ promoted})$	α	$\alpha + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta)$
$E(q_i i \text{ applied})$	1	$\frac{\alpha q_H + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta) q_L}{\alpha + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta)}$
$E(\text{Payoff}_i)$	α	$\alpha + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta)$

Notes: Shaded areas indicate higher values. In *Case 1* evaluators are biased in favor of connected candidates, but there no information asymmetries. In *Case 2*, evaluators are (un)informed about the quality of (un)connected candidates, but evaluators do not favor connected candidates and there is perfect information about evaluators' standards. In *Case 3* prospective candidates are (un)informed about the evaluation standards of (un)connected evaluators, but there are no information asymmetries about the quality of applicants and evaluators do not favor connections.

Table 2: Descriptive statistics – Eligible evaluators

	1	2	3	4
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
<i>Based in Italy (N=5,876):</i>				
Female	0.20	0.40	0	1
All publications	131	104	4	957
- Articles	73	85	0	920
- Books	8	10	0	139
- Book chapters	22	26	0	455
- Conference proceedings	20	37	0	401
- Patents	0.42	2.44	0	88
- Other	7	23	0	675
Average Article Influence Score	1.18	0.73	0.1	9.65
A-journal articles	11	16	0	207
<i>Based abroad (N=1,365):</i>				
Female	0.12	0.32	0	1

Notes: Article Influence Score is defined for publications by professors in STEM&Med fields. A-journal articles are defined for publications by professors in the social sciences and humanities.

Table 3: Descriptive statistics – Applications

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
			Position		Coauthor or colleague		
			FP	AP	Yes	No	
Initial set of applications (N=69,020)							
	Mean	St.Dev.	Mean	Mean	Mean	Mean	p-value
<i>Individual characteristics:</i>							
Female	0.38	0.49	0.31	0.41	0.39	0.38	0.002
Age	44	8	49	43	0.05	-0.01	0.000
Permanent university position:	0.55	0.5	0.74	0.47	0.74	0.52	0.000
- same field	0.75	0.43	0.77	0.74	0.79	0.74	0.000
<i>Quality indicators:</i>							
CV length (pages)	16	67	20	14	0.08	-0.02	0.000
All Publications:	64	67	89	53	0.08	-0.02	0.000
- Articles	37	51	53	30	0.07	-0.01	0.000
- Books	2	5	3	2	0.01	-0.00	0.509
- Book chapters	7	12	10	6	0.06	-0.01	0.000
- Conference proceedings	10	20	14	8	0.07	-0.01	0.000
- Patents	0.24	1.65	0.35	0.19	0.00	-0.00	0.936
- Other	7	22	8	7	-0.02	0.00	0.004
Average number of coauthors	6	18	6	6	0.01	-0.00	0.229
First-authored	0.22	0.2	0.22	0.22	-0.02	0.00	0.069
Last-authored	0.12	0.16	0.15	0.11	0.03	-0.01	0.002
Average Article Influence Score	1.31	0.97	1.31	1.30	-0.01	0.00	0.296
A-journal articles	4	7	6	3	0.09	-0.01	0.000
Application order	0.5	0.29	0.5	0.5	0.46	0.51	0.000
Final set of applications (N=59,150)							
<i>Production in the previous 10 years:</i>							
Social Sciences and Humanities:							
- Articles	20	17	25	18	0.16	-0.02	0.000
- A-journal articles	3	4	3	2	0.09	-0.01	0.000
- Books	2	3	3	2	0.02	-0.00	0.367
Sciences:							
- Articles	37	45	46	32	0.06	-0.01	0.000
- Citations	60	102	77	52	0.05	-0.01	0.000
- H-index	11	7	13	10	0.09	-0.02	0.000
Above the median in 3 indicators	0.38	0.48	0.42	0.36	0.46	0.36	0.000
Below the median in 3 indicators	0.16	0.36	0.13	0.17	0.12	0.17	0.000

Notes: Article Influence Score is defined for publications by professors in STEM&Med fields. A-journal articles are defined for publications by professors in the social sciences and humanities. Columns 5-6 provide information for the subset of applicants who had a connection in the committee and the subset who did not. Column 7 reports the p-value for the t-test of difference in means between the two groups. In columns 5-6 productivity indicators and age are normalized at the exam level.

Table 4: Descriptive statistics – Outcomes

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
			Position		Coauthor or colleague		
			FP	AP	Yes	No	p-value
Initial set of applications (N=69,020)							
Withdraws	0.14	0.35	0.16	0.13	0.17	0.14	0.000
Fails	0.49	0.50	0.48	0.50	0.34	0.52	0.000
Qualifies	0.37	0.48	0.36	0.37	0.49	0.34	0.000
Final set of applications (N=59,150)							
Qualifies	0.43	0.49	0.43	0.43	0.59	0.40	0.000
Unanimous decision	0.86	0.35	0.84	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.813
Individual evaluations (N=294,656)							
Length (in words)	176	277	203	164	193	175	0.000
Positive votes	0.45	.50	0.46	0.44	0.64	0.44	0.000
Set of withdrawn applications (N=9,870)							
Reapplies in 2013	0.37	0.48	0.32	0.40	0.44	0.36	0.000
Set of re-applicants in 2013 (N=3,684)							
Qualifies	0.58	0.49	0.59	0.57	0.67	0.55	0.000

Notes: We observe 99.7% of individual evaluations (294,656 out of 295,666 evaluations).

Table 5: Randomization test

	1	2	3	4	5
Dependent variable:	Female	Age	Perm.pos. same field	Perm.pos., other field	Appl. order
Connection in committee	0.005 (0.006)	0.026* (0.014)	0.002 (0.008)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.000 (0.004)
	6	7	8	9	10
Dependent variable:	CV length	Publ.	A-journal articles	Total AIS	Coauthors
Connection in committee	-0.025 (0.017)	0.001 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.018)	-0.015 (0.019)

Notes: OLS estimates based on the initial set of applications. All regressions include exam fixed effects and set of dummy variables for the expected number of connections in the committee (192 dummies). Dependent variables in columns 2, 5-10 are normalized at the exam level.

Standard errors are clustered at the committee level. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.

Table 6: The effect of connections on first-round outcomes

	1	2	3	4	5	6
	All	All	All	Research productivity:		
				High	Medium	Low
	ITT	ITT	IV	IV	IV	IV
A.			Applies in the 1 st round			
Connection in committee	-0.027*** (0.005)	-0.027*** (0.005)	-0.030*** (0.005)	-0.009 (0.006)	-0.019** (0.008)	-0.062*** (0.011)
Individual controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R-squared	0.045	0.118	0.119	0.146	0.120	0.138
Mean, no connections	0.862	0.862	0.862	0.935	0.869	0.799
Connection effect, %	-3.1	-3.2	-3.5	-0.9	-2.2	-7.8
B.			Qualifies in the 1 st round			
Connection in committee	0.039*** (0.007)	0.041*** (0.006)	0.045*** (0.006)	0.053*** (0.010)	0.047*** (0.009)	0.030*** (0.009)
Individual controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R-squared	0.111	0.307	0.307	0.336	0.274	0.255
Mean, no connections	0.344	0.344	0.344	0.548	0.387	0.149
Connection effect, %	11.3	12.0	13.2	9.7	12.1	19.9
C.			Fails in the 1 st round			
Connection in committee	-0.066*** (0.007)	-0.068*** (0.006)	-0.075*** (0.007)	-0.061*** (0.010)	-0.066*** (0.009)	-0.092*** (0.012)
Individual controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R-squared	0.109	0.237	0.237	0.295	0.220	0.205
Mean, no connections	0.518	0.518	0.518	0.387	0.482	0.650
Connection effect, %	-12.7	-13.2	-14.5	-15.9	-13.6	-14.1
Observations	69,020	69,020	69,020	21,443	21,800	25,777

Notes: Columns 1 and 2 report results from an OLS estimation where the right-hand side variable is the initial composition of the committee determined by the random draw. Columns 3-6 report results from estimations where the final composition of the committee has been instrumented using its initial composition.

In columns 4-6, researchers are classified according to their research productivity, as measured by the total Article Influence Score in STEM&Med fields and by publications in A-journals in the social sciences and humanities.

All regressions include exam fixed effects and a set of dummy variables for the expected number of connections in committee. Columns 2-6 also include a set of dummies for position and university, and the set of individual controls listed in the upper panel of Table 3

Standard errors are clustered at the committee level. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.

Table 7: Evaluators' individual voting

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Sample:	All final candidates		Research productivity:			Re-applicants
			High	Medium	Low	in 2 nd round
Connection	0.039*** (0.005)	0.039*** (0.005)	0.030*** (0.005)	0.043*** (0.006)	0.047*** (0.008)	0.034*** (0.011)
Candidate fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Evaluator fixed-effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	294,656	294,656	99,747	93,969	100,940	10,125
Number of applications	58,948	58,948	19,957	18,799	20,192	2025
Mean, no connections	0.440	0.440	0.624	0.488	0.217	0.577
Connection effect, %	9.0	8.9	4.8	8.8	21.5	5.9

Notes: OLS estimates. Each observation represents evaluator j assessment of candidate i . The dependent variable is a dummy that takes value one if the evaluator votes in favor of the candidate. In columns 1-5, the vote is from the first evaluation round. In column 6, the vote is from the second round, and the sample is composed of individuals who withdrew the application in the first round and reapplied again in the second round. Evaluations in the second round are available for 116 out of 184 fields, in which reports were published before May 2015.

In column 6, standard errors are clustered at the committee level.

*** denotes significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.

Table 8: The impact of connections on 2nd round outcomes

	1	2
Dependent variable:	Reapplies in the 2 nd round	Qualifies in the 2 nd round
Sample:	Withdrew in the 1 st round	Reapplied in the 2 nd round
Connection in committee	0.041*** (0.014)	0.095*** (0.025)
Observations	9,870	3,684
Adjusted R-squared	0.158	0.210
Mean, no connections	0.357	0.549
Connection effect, %	11.4	17.4

Notes: OLS estimates. All regressions include exam fixed effects and a set of dummy variables for the expected number of connections in committee. Individual controls include position, university, and all variables in the upper panel of Table 3.

Standard errors are clustered at the committee level. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.

Table 9: Identification based on observables

	1	2	3	4	5
Dependent variable:	Qualifies	Positive votes	Qualifies		
Sample:	All final candidates		Research productivity:		
			High	Medium	Low
Connection in committee	0.066*** (0.006)	0.319*** (0.028)	0.066*** (0.009)	0.062*** (0.008)	0.064*** (0.010)
Observations	59,150	59,150	20,028	18,855	20,267
Adjusted R-squared	0.422	0.451	0.380	0.373	0.381
Mean, no connections	0.399	2.084	0.586	0.446	0.186
Connection effect, %	16.6	15.3	11.2	13.9	34.1

Notes: OLS estimates. The sample is composed of all final applicants who received evaluations. All regressions include exam fixed effects, a set of dummy variables for the expected number of connections in committee, a set of dummies for position and university, and the set of individual controls listed in Table 3. Standard errors are clustered at the committee level. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.

Table 10: The effect of connections on two-period outcomes and promotion

	1	2	3	4
	All	Research productivity:		
		High	Medium	Low
A. Applies in the 1st or the 2nd round				
Connection in committee	-0.012*** (0.004)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.001 (0.006)	-0.036*** (0.009)
Mean, no connections	0.911	0.961	0.925	0.861
Connection effect, %	-1.3	-0.2	0.1	-4.2
B. Qualifies in the 1st or the 2nd round				
Connection in committee	0.062*** (0.006)	0.059*** (0.010)	0.066*** (0.009)	0.053*** (0.010)
Mean, no connections	0.371	0.566	0.421	0.178
Connection effect, %	16.6	10.3	15.7	30.0
C. Fails in the 1st or the 2nd round				
Connection in committee	-0.073*** (0.007)	-0.060*** (0.010)	-0.066*** (0.009)	-0.089*** (0.011)
Mean, no connections	0.540	0.394	0.504	0.684
Connection effect, %	-13.6	-15.1	-13.0	-13.0
D. Promoted by December 2015				
Connection in committee	0.013*** (0.004)	0.009 (0.010)	0.010 (0.007)	0.021*** (0.006)
Mean, no connections	0.121	0.140	0.092	0.038
Connection effect, %	10.4	6.5	10.9	55.9
Observations	69,020	21,443	21,800	25,777

Notes: The table reports results from instrumental variables estimations where the final composition of the committee has been instrumented using the outcome of the initial random draw.

All regressions include exam fixed effects, a set of dummy variables for the expected number of connections in committee, a set of dummies for position and university, and the set of individual controls listed in the upper panel of Table 3. Standard errors are clustered at the committee level. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** significance at 5% and * significance at 10%.